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A NEW METHODOLOGY FOR FISCAL 






  The size and pattern of a public budget depend, among other factors, on the 
visibility of both the burden and benefit of public revenue and expenditure. Furthermore, 
such visibility is a necessary - not a sufficient - condition for an efficient allocation of 
resources between the private and public sectors of an economy. 
 
  Although the importance of this visibility has been well known by academicians 
and practitioners for a long time, attempts to quantify it by taking the internal structure of 
every type of revenue and expenditure and its relative financial weight in a fiscal system 
into consideration are recent, and indicators used till now rest on several structural 
parameters, each of them ranging from 0 to 1, which are combined in a multiplicative 
formula. For this reason a 0 estimate will always result as one of such factors is also 0. 
 
  Starting from previous factors and parameters, an alternative and probably more 
fruitful way to measure visibility of burden and benefit of a public budget can consist of 
combining them in an additive - instead of a multiplicative - way. Then a null parametric 
value will not necessarily result in a 0 estimate, and calculations can show higher final 
values much more sensitive to values of other parameters. 
 
  The aim of this contribution, based on a recent research, is to present and compare 
new additive indicators to be applied to the several - local, intermediate, central - territorial 
government levels in OECD member countries by using data and qualitative information 
provided by International Monetary Fund. New estimates for European Union member 
countries and conclusions are offered for general criticism, discussion and development. 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  An insufficient fiscal visibility
1 of burden and benefit of public revenue and 
expenditure can introduce important biases in both the size and pattern of government 
budgets [Wagner, 1976; Pommerehne and Scheneider, 1978; Oates, 1988]. That is why to 
measure and raise such visibility is so important. 
 
  Initial indicators were defined to take the influence on fiscal visibility of internal 
structures of types of public revenue and expenditure into account; and first estimations 
were made for several territorial government levels of the European Union member 
countries [Roig-Alonso, 1998, 2000, 2001]. But because of the multiplicative combination 
of relevant parameters used for such indicators, a 0 estimate will always result as anyone 
of such parameters was also 0. 
 
  An alternative - and probably more fruitful way - to measure visibility of burden 
and benefit of a public budget can consist of combining these parameters in an additive 
instead of a multiplicative way. Then a null parametric value will not necessarily result in 
a 0 estimate, and calculations can show higher final values and be much more sensitive to 
values of other non-null parameters. 
 
  The aim of this contribution, based on a recent research project carried out at the 
Public Finance and Public Sector Economics Research Unit of the University of Valencia, 
is to present: 
 
A) New additive - instead of multiplicative - indicators to be applied to the several - 
central, intermediate, local - territorial government levels in OECD member countries 
from data and qualitative information provided by the International Monetary Fund. 
 
B) First alternative estimates of fiscal visibility referred to the several territorial 
government levels of the European Union member countries for which the International 
Monetary Fund has data available. 
 
  Conclusions and comments are offered at the end of the paper. 
 
 
2. AN INDEX OF BURDEN VISIBILITY OF TOTAL PUBLIC REVENUE 
 
  In general, for every level, L, of territorial public administrations of an economy, a 
visibility index, VL
R, of its total public revenue, R, was defined in such a way that 0 ≤   
VL
R ≤  1, based on the following formula: 








L   ∑ 
where: 
 
a) n = number of types of public revenue R for level L of territorial public administrations; 
 
b) xiL
R = relative financial weight of public revenue R of type i for level L of territorial 
public administrations, with i = 1, 2, ..., n; that is to say: 
 0 ≤  
GF
















R = visibility or perceptibility (for the policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider) 
factor of burden of public revenue R of type i to which level L of territorial public 
administrations is entitled, with 0 ≤  yiL
R ≤  1. 
 
 
3. BURDEN VISIBILITY OF A SPECIFIC PUBLIC REVENUE 
 
  An objective estimate of yiL
R - factor of perceptibility of the direct burden by a 
policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider of a public revenue R of type i for level L of 
territorial public administrations - was initially defined (Roig-Alonso, 1998) according to 













R = voluntary (viL
R = 0) or coercive (viL
R = 1) nature of public revenue R of type i for 
its policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider (coerciveness parameter), with 0 ≤  viL




R = full (piL
R = 0) or null (piL
R = 1) proportionality of the quantity of public revenue 
R of type i - the burden of which is borne by a policy intended - or legal - revenue-
provider - to the cost of efficiently producing the good or service specifically received by 
him in return for his burden (proportionality parameter), with 0 ≤  piL
R ≤  1. 
 
c) miL
R = full (miL
R = 1) or null (miL
R = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal - 
revenue-provider on the concept of the direct burden he is bearing when providing public 
revenue R of type i (concept-information parameter), with 0 ≤  miL
R ≤  1. 
 
d) qiL
R = full (qiL
R = 1) or null (qiL
R = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal - 
revenue-provider on the quantity of the direct burden he is bearing when providing public 
revenue R of type i (quantity-information parameter), with 0 ≤  qiL
R ≤  1. 
 
e) iiL
R = intermediate (iiL
R = 0) or final (iiL
R = 1) position of the policy intended - or legal - 
revenue-provider in relation to his direct burden (burden-shifting parameter), with 0 ≤  iiL
R 
≤  1. 
 








R were continuous 
variables ranging from 0 to 1, i and L were subscripts for the type of revenue and level of 
territorial public administration respectively and R was a superscript - non an exponent - 
for public revenue. 
   Because of the multiplicative combination of such five significant parameters in 
yiL
R, as any one of them takes a null value a 0 estimate will necessarily result, although 
other parameters can show high values. 
 
  In order to avoid this problem, this visibility or perceptibility factor can be 








R] / 5 (2) 
 
 
4. INDEX OF BENEFIT VISIBILITY OF TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
 
  Similarly to the case of public revenue, for every level of territorial public 
administrations, L, a general index, VL
E, of benefit visibility of total public expenditure, E, 
was be defined in such a way that 0 ≤  VL
E ≤  1, based on the following formula: 








L   ∑ 
where: 
 




E = relative financial weight of public expenditure E of type f performed by level L 
of territorial public administrations, with f = 1, 2, ..., q; that is to say: 
 
0 ≤  
GF












E = absolute quantity of public expenditure E of type f performed by level L of 
territorial public administrations; 
 
c) yfL
E = visibility or perceptibility (by the policy intended - or legal - consumer) factor of 
benefit of public expenditure E of type f performed by level L of territorial public 
administrations, where 0 ≤  yfL
E ≤  1. 
 
 
5. BENEFIT VISIBILITY OF A SPECIFIC PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
 
  An objective estimate of yfL
E (factor of perceptibility by a policy intended - or 
legal - consumer of the direct benefit of a public expenditure E of type f performed by 













E = null (vfL
E = 0) or full (vfL
E = 1) consumption of a publicly supplied good of type f 
by its policy intended - or legal - user or beneficiary (consumption parameter), with 0 ≤  
vfL
E ≤  1. 
 
b) pfL
E = full (pfL
E = 0) or null (pfL
E = 1) proportionality of cost of efficient production of 
the publicly supplied good of type f to a specifically requited monetary burden borne by 
the policy intended - or legal - user or beneficiary (proportionality parameter), with 0 ≤  
pfL
E ≤  1. 
 
c) mfL
E = full (mfL
E = 1) or null (mfL
E = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal - 
consumer or user on the concept of the direct benefit he is receiving when public 
expenditure E of type f is being performed (concept-information parameter), with 0 ≤  mfL
E 
≤  1. 
 
d) qfL
E = full (qfL
E = 1) or null (qfL
E = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal - 
consumer or user on the quantity of the direct benefit he is receiving when public 
expenditure E of type f is performed (quantity-information parameter), with 0 ≤  qfL
E ≤  1. 
 
e) ifL
E = intermediate (ifL
E = 0) or final (ifL
E = 1) position of the policy intended - or legal - 
user or beneficiary of the publicly supplied good of type f in relation to his direct benefit 
(benefit-shifting parameter), with 0 ≤  ifL
E ≤  1. 
 









E were continuous variables always ranging from 0 to 1, f and L were 
subscripts for the type of public expenditure and level of territorial public administration 
respectively and E was a superscript - non an exponent - for public expenditure. 
 
  Again, as anyone of such five parameters takes value 0, the multiplicative 
combination of them in yfL
E necessarily results in a 0 estimate although other parameters 
can show high values; and in order to avoid this problem, this visibility or perceptibility 
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6. ESTIMATES ON BURDEN VISIBILITY OF TOTAL PUBLIC REVENUE 
 
  Tables 2, 3, and 4 present alternative and more recent estimates on burden 
visibility of public revenue and grants of the European Union member countries by 
applying index 








L   ∑ 
 
previously defined, to the central, intermediate, and local fiscal sub-systems now in force 
in these countries. 
 
  Such values have been calculated mainly from information and primary data on 
public cash flows provided by both the Commission of the European Communities
2, 
reflecting tax structures of - and the institutional situation in - every member country on January 1, 1992, and the International Monetary Fund
3. 
 
  To obtain a sensitivity analysis, three hypotheses on minimum, plausible, and 
maximum shifting of tax burden have been assumed, giving rise to the corresponding 
series of maximum, VM, plausible, Vp, and minimum, Vm, values of weighted-visibility 
estimates of revenue burden for policy intended - or legal - revenue-providers. The initial 
values for the fiscal visibility parameters v, p, m, q, iM, ip, im - shown in Table 1 - are the 
same previously used for the multiplicative version of indicators [Roig-Alonso, 1998, 
2000, 2001]. 
 
  As regards results, according to: 
 
A) Table 2, presenting VM, Vp, and Vm visibility estimates of burden of revenue and grants 
for the consolidated central government level of the total fifteen European Union member 
countries, Sweden, with values ranging from 99.97 to 86.55, has the most visible sub-
system, Greece having the least visible one, with values ranging from 81.70 to 73.69. 
Differences among European countries are quite significant. 
 
B) Table 3, presenting VM, Vp, and Vm visibility estimates of burden revenue and grants 
for three European Union member countries with intermediate level government, 
Germany, with values ranging from 77.18 to 69.29, has the most visible intermediate sub-
system, Spain having the least visible one, with values ranging from 46.00 to 42.51. Now, 
at this level of government, differences between these two countries are very significant. 
 
C) Table 4, presenting VM, Vp, and Vm visibility estimates of burden revenue and grants 
for the local level of fourteen European Union member countries, Italy, with values 
ranging from 92.26 to 80.34, has the most visible local sub-system, Netherlands having the 
least visible one, with values ranging from 41.14 to 38.49, showing this level of 




Values Imputed to Fiscal Visibility Parameters 
(approximate average values) 
 
1. Income, profits, capital gains 
taxes 
       
1.1.  Individual  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 
1.2.  Corporate  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 
1.3. Other unallocable taxes  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.62  0.25 
2. Social security contributions               
2.1.  Employees  1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 
2.2.  Employers  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 
2.3. Self-employed or non-employed               1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 
2.4. Other unallocable 
contributions 
1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 
3. Taxes on payroll and work force  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.75  0.50 
4. Taxes on property               
















4.2. Recurrent on net wealth               
4.2.1.  Individual  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 
4.2.2.  Corporate  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 
4.3. Estate, inheritance, gift taxes  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.75  0.50 
















4.5. Nonrecurrent taxes on 
property 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 
















5. Domestic taxes on good and 
services 
       
5.1. General sales and value-added   1.00  1.00  1.00  0.75  1.00  0.87  0.75 
5.2.  Excises  1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.87 0.75 
5.3. Profits of fiscal monopolies  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.87  0.75 
5.4. Taxes on specific services  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.87  0.75 
5.5. Taxes on use of goods or 
activities 
       














5.5.2. Motor vehicle taxes  1.00   1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.75  0.50 
5.5.3. Other taxes on use of goods  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.75  0.50 
















6. Taxes on international trade               
6.1.  Import  duties         
6.1.1.  Customs  duties  1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 
6.1.2. Other import charges  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.75  0.50 6.2.  Export  duties  1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 
















6.4.  Exchange  profits  1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 
6.5.  Exchange  rates  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 
















7.  Other  taxes         
7.1.  Poll  taxes  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 
7.2.  Stamp  taxes  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 
7.3. Taxes not elsewhere classified  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.50  0.00 
8. Entrepreneurial and property 
income 
       
8.1. Cash operating surpluses  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00       










   
8.3. Other property income  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00       
9. Administrative fees and charges  0.50  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.50  0.00 
10. Fines and forfeits  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.75  0.50 
11. Contributions to government 
employee pensions 
       
11.1.  Employees  1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 
11.2.  Employer  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 
12. Other nontax revenue  0.00  0.50  1.00  1.00       
13. Sales on fixed capital assets  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00       
14. Sales of stocks  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00       










   




      
16.1. From residents  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00       
16.2. From abroad  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00       
17. Grants from abroad               
17.1.  Current  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00      17.2.  Capital  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00      
18. Grants from other levels of 
national government 
       
18.1.  Current  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00      
18.2.  Capital  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00      
19. Grants from supranational 
authorities to member countries 
 
 
      
19.1.  Current  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00      
19.2.  Capital  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00      
20. Grants to supranational 
authorities 
       
20.1.  Current  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00      
20.2.  Capital  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00      
DEFICIT  0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00      
 
Notes for table 1: 
v = degree of coercion of public revenue for its legal provider. 
p = degree of specific requital of public revenue for its legal provider. 
m = degree of information on the public revenue concept for its legal provider. 
q = degree of information on the public revenue quantity for its legal provider. 
iM = maximum incidence of the direct monetary burden onto the legal provider of 
public revenue. 
ip = plausible incidence of the direct monetary burden onto the legal provider of public 
revenue. 
im = minimum incidence of the direct monetary burden onto the legal provider of public 
revenue. 
 




Estimates of Public Revenue Visibility in the European Union 
Consolidated Central Government 
(percentages) 
MEMBER COUNTRIES / YEARS  VM V p V m 
Austria, 1994  90.26  84.62  79.03 
Belgium, 1998  94.71  88.68  82.70 
Denmark, 2000  87.45  83.20  79.04 
Finland, 1998  86.03  82.08  77.02 
France, 1993  90.63  84.65  78.71 Germany, 1996  88.74  82.88  77.06 
Greece, 1998  81.70  77.64  73.69 
Ireland, 1997  87.45  82.47  77.55 
Italy, 1999  92.54  86.28  80.34 
Luxembourg, 1995  90.10  84.42  78.79 
Netherlands, 1997  90.47  85.02  79.60 
Portugal, 1998  82.88  78.11  73.41 
Spain, 1997  90.62  84.52  78.47 
Sweden, 1999  99.97  93.23  86.55 
United Kingdom, 1998  91.45  86.11  80.83 
 
 
Source: own elaboration from data on Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000, 




Estimates of Public Revenue Visibility in the European Union 
Intermediate Government Level 
(percentages) 
MEMBER COUNTRIES / YEARS  VM V p V m 
Austria, 1994  62.14  58.95  55.80 
Germany, 1996  77.18  73.21  69.29 
Spain, 1997  46.00  44.25  42.51 
 
Source: own elaboration from data on Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000, 




Estimates of Public Revenue Visibility in the European Union 
Local Government 
(percentages) 
MEMBER COUNTRIES / YEARS  VM V p V m 
Austria, 1994  78.95  73.93  68.95 
Belgium, 1998  54.67  52.48  50.32 
Denmark, 2000  71.97  68.50  65.03 
Finland, 1998  70.11  66.40  62.70 France, 1993  66.33  62.44  58.56 
Germany, 1996  66.64  62.96  59.28 
Greece, 1998  -  -  - 
Ireland, 1997  34.50  33.76  33.02 
Italy, 1999  92.26  86.28  80.34 
Luxembourg, 1995  66.24  62.72  59.21 
Netherlands, 1997  41.14  39.82  38.49 
Portugal, 1998  60.79  58.33  55.90 
Spain, 1997  69.95  66.36  62.81 
Sweden, 1999  89.10  83.03  77.01 
United Kingdom, 1998  41.53  40.11  38.70 
 
- Insufficient available data. 
 
Source: own elaboration from data on Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000, 
volume XXIV, International Monetary Fund, Washington. 
 
 
7. ESTIMATES ON BENEFIT VISIBILITY OF TOTAL PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE 
  
  In turn, tables 6, 7, and 8 present alternative and more recent estimates on 
benefit visibility of public expenditure and grants of the European Union member 
countries, obtained by applying index 
 








L   ∑ 
 
to the central, intermediate, and local fiscal sub-systems now in force in these countries. 
 
  Such values have been calculated mainly from information and primary data on 
public cash flows provided by the International Monetary Fund
3. 
 
  As before, three hypotheses on minimum, plausible, and maximum shifting of 
expenditure benefit have been assumed to obtain a sensitivity analysis, giving rise to the 
corresponding series of maximum, VM, plausible, Vp, and minimum, Vm, values of 
weighted-visibility estimates of expenditure benefit for the policy intended - or legal - 
beneficiary of every type of good and service publicly provided. The initial approximate 
values for the fiscal visibility parameters v, p, m, q, iM, ip, im - now shown in Table 5 - are 
the same previously used for the multiplicative indicators [Roig-Alonso, 1998, 2000, 
2001]. 
  
  As regards results, according to:  
A) Table 6, presenting VM, Vp, and Vm visibility estimates of public expenditure for the 
consolidated central government level of twelve European Union member countries, 
Germany, with values ranging from 86.36 to 78.03, has the most visible fiscal sub-system, 
and again Greece the least visible one, with values ranging from 84.19 to 74.78. But now 
differences among countries are not significant at this level of government. 
 
B) Table 7, presenting VM, Vp, and Vm visibility estimates of public expenditure for the 
intermediate government level of three European Union member countries, Austria, with 
values ranging from 84.47 to 75.23, has the most visible fiscal sub-system, and Germany 
the least visible one, with values ranging from 84.18 to 74.74. Again differences among 
countries are not significant at this level of government. 
 
C) Table 8, presenting VM, Vp, and Vm visibility estimates of public expenditure for the 
local government level of only nine European Union member countries, Sweden, with 
values ranging from 85.43 to 76.98, has the most visible fiscal sub-system, and 
Luxembourg the least visible one, with values ranging from 83.67 to 73.89. As at the 
central and intermediate levels of government of public expenditure, differences among 




Values Imputed to Fiscal Visibility Parameters of Public Expenditure 
(approximate average values) 
 
1. General public services               
1.1. Executive and legislative 
organs, financial and fiscal affairs, 























1.2. Foreign economic aid  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.50  0.75  0.50  0.25 
















1.4.  General  services  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25 
















2. Defense affairs and services               
2.1. Military and civil defense 















2.2. Foreign military aid  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.50  0.75  0.50  0.25 
2.3. Defense-related applied 































3. Public order and safety affairs               
3.1. Police and fire protection  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.50  0.75  0.50  0.25 
3.2.  Law  courts  1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25 
















3.4. Public order and safety affairs 















4. Education affairs and services               
4.1. Pre-primary and primary 
















































4.4. Education services not 















4.5. Subsidiary services to 
education 
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.25 
4.6. Education affairs and services 















5. Health affairs and services               
5.1. Hospital affairs and services  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.50  1.00  0.75  0.50 
5.2. Clinics, and medical, dental, 















5.3. Public health affairs and  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50 
5.4. Medicaments, prostheses, 
medical equipment and appliances, 






























5.5. Applied research and 
experimental development related 













































0.50 6. Social security and welfare 
affairs and services 
       
















6.2. Welfare affairs and services  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.75  1.00  1.00  1.00 
6.3. Social security and welfare 















7. Housing and community amenity 
affairs and services 
       
















7.2. Water supply affairs and 
services 
1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.50 
7.3. Sanitary affairs and services 







































7.5. Housing and community 























8. Recreational, cultural affairs                
8.0. Recreational, cultural, and 















9. Fuel and energy affairs and 
services 
       
9.1. Fuel affairs and services  1.00  0.75  1.00  0.50  0.75  0.50  0.25 
















9.3. Fuel and energy affairs and 















10. Agriculture, forestry, fishing. 
and hunting affairs and services 
       
















10.2. Forestry affairs and services  1.00  0.50  1.00  0.50  0.75  0.50  0.25 















0.25 10.4. Agricultural research and 























10.5. Agriculture, forestry, fishing, 























11. Mining and mineral resource 
affairs and services, other than 
fuels; manufacturing affairs and 
services; and construction affairs 
and services 
       
11.1. Mining and mineral resource 

















































11.4. Mining and mineral resource 
affairs and services not elsewhere 
classified; manufacturing affairs 
and services not elsewhere 
classified; and construction affairs 












































12. Transportation and 
communication affairs and services 
       
































12.3. Railway affairs and services  1.00  0.50  1.00  0.75  0.75  0.50  0.25 
12.4. Air transport affairs and 















12.5. Pipeline transport and other 
















12.6. Transportation system affairs 






































12.8. Transportation and 
communication affairs and services 






















13. Other economic affairs and 
services 
       
13.1. Distribution trade affairs and 
services including storage and 
warehousing; hotel and restaurant 





























13.2. Tourism affairs and services  1.00  0.75  1.00  0.50  1.00  0.75  0.50 
13.3. Multipurpose development 















13.4. General economic and 
commercial affairs other than 






































13.6. Other economic affairs and 















14. Expenditures not classified by 
major group 
       

















Notes for table 5: 
v = degree of consumption of a publicly supplied good by the policy-intended or legal 
beneficiary. 
p = degree of proportional cost of the efficient production of the publicly supplied good to 
a specifically requited monetary burden born by the policy-intended or legal beneficiary. 
m = degree of information to the policy-intended or legal beneficiary on the concept of the 
direct benefit he is receiving when public expenditure is being performed. 
q = degree of information to the policy-intended or legal beneficiary on the quantity of the 
direct benefit he is receiving when public expenditure is being performed. 
iM = maximum incidence of the direct monetary benefit onto the policy-intended or legal 
beneficiary of a publicly supplied good. 
ip = plausible incidence of the direct monetary benefit onto the policy-intended or legal 
beneficiary of a publicly supplied good. 
im = minimum incidence of the direct monetary benefit onto the policy-intended or legal 
beneficiary of a publicly supplied good. 
 
Source: Roig-Alonso, 2001.  
 
TABLE 6 
Estimates of Public Expenditure Visibility in the European Union 
Consolidated Central Government 
(percentages) 
MEMBER COUNTRIES / YEARS  VM V p V m 
Austria, 1994  85.81  81.58  77.35 
Belgium, 1998  -  -  - 
Denmark, 2000  85.27  80.93  76.62 
Finland, 1998  84.73  80.33  75.92 
France, 1993  85.66  81.31  76.96 
Germany, 1996  86.36  82.19  78.03 
Greece, 1998  84.19  79.48  74.78 
Ireland, 1997  84.49  79.92  75.36 
Italy, 1999  -  -  - 
Luxembourg, 1995  85.28  81.13  76.97 
Netherlands, 1997  85.45  81.07  76.69 
Portugal, 1998  -  -  - 
Spain, 1997  85.82  81.48  77.14 
Sweden, 1999  85.43  81.20  76.98 
United Kingdom, 1998  85.66  81.26  76.87 
 
- Insufficient available data. 
 
Source: own elaboration from data on Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000, 





Estimates of Public Expenditure Visibility in the European Union 
Intermediate Government Level 
(percentages) 
MEMBER COUNTRIES / YEARS  VM V p V m 
Austria, 1994  84.47  79.85  75.23 
Germany, 1996  84.18  79.46  74.74 
Spain, 1997  84.24  79.33  74.42  
Source: own elaboration from data on Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000, 




Estimates of Public Expenditure Visibility in the European Union 
Local Government 
MEMBER COUNTRIES / YEARS  VM V p V m 
Austria, 1994  -  -  - 
Belgium, 1998  -  -  - 
Denmark, 2000  85.26  80.94  76.63 
Finland, 1998  -  -  - 
France, 1993  84.87  80.16  75.46 
Germany, 1996  85.27  80.68  76.09 
Greece, 1998  -  -  - 
Ireland, 1997  84.84  79.93  75.02 
Italy, 1999  -  -  - 
Luxembourg, 1995  83.67  78.78  73.89 
Netherlands, 1997  84.97  80.35  75.73 
Portugal, 1998  -  -  - 
Spain, 1997  84.38  79.46  74.54 
Sweden, 1999  85.43  81.20  76.98 
United Kingdom, 1998  84.91  80.45  76.00 
 
- Insufficient available data. 
 
Source: own elaboration from data on Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000, 





  The quality of public revenue and expenditure sub-systems and systems as policy 
instruments for efficiently allocating economic resources among private and public sectors 
and sub-sectors varies as a result of economic, political, and social factors. 
 
  The new and alternative indices of fiscal visibility previously redefined by 
combining significant parameters in an additive - instead a multiplicative - formula bring 
forward a more sensitive measurement methodology which can be used to make relevant quantified comparisons among member countries of the International Monetary Fund 
provided that detailed statistic figures on execution of public budgets as well as 
information about the nature of the different types of public administrations' revenue and 
expenditure programmes are available to researchers. 
 
  Estimates obtained from different assumptions on tax and expenditure shifting by 
using these new additive indices to measure the visibility of revenue burden and 
expenditure benefit of central, intermediate, and local fiscal sub-systems now in force in 
the European Union member countries show, in addition to previous remarks, the 
following observations: 
 
First.- Burden visibility values for all these countries which are higher than those 
previously estimated [Roig, 1998, 2000, 2001] in general. Such relatively higher values 
stem from the fact that by applying the new formula here presented a null parameter 
affecting any specific type of public revenue does not result necessarily in a 0 estimate for 
its visibility. 
 
Second.- The concurrence of several factors (such as non-coerciveness, non-existence of 
specific requitals, lack of information on concepts and quantities, partial shifting of burden 
by tax-payers, intergovernmental grants, etc.) can explain why burden visibility values are 
still lower than 100.00. 
 
Third.- Burden visibility values for the consolidated central government are higher than 
those estimated for the intermediate and local levels of same countries, mainly owing to 
significant grants received by sub-central public administrations from central public 
administration. 
 
Fourth.- In general, benefit visibility values for all countries compared are also higher than 
those previously estimated [Roig, 2000, 2001]. Again such relatively higher values stem 
from the fact that with the new formula a null parameter affecting a specific type of public 
expenditure does not result necessarily in a 0 estimate for its visibility. 
 
Fifth.- The concurrence of several factors (specially an insufficient information on costs of 
goods and services publicly provided to users and consumers) can explain why benefit 
visibility values are still lower than 100.00. 
 
Sixth.- Contrary to burden visibility, differences of benefit visibility values among central, 
intermediate, and local government levels are not significant. 
 
Seventh.- Benefit visibility values are lower than those of burden visibility for the same 
countries specially owing to the fact that beneficiaries of goods and services are not 
properly informed on costs incurred for the public provision of such goods and services. 
 
Eighth.- Benefit visibility values are higher than burden visibility values at intermediate 
and local levels for the same countries, suggesting a tendency to a public over-provision of 
goods and services at these government levels stemming from significant grants received 
by sub-central authorities from central public administrations. On the contrary, benefit 
visibility values are lower than burden visibility values at the central level, pointing out an 
opposing tendency to a public under-provision of goods and services at this government 
level.  
Ninth.- Policy implications of these alternative estimates seem straightforward for the 
European Union: as both present revenue and benefit visibility are not near to 100.00 in 
general, allocation improvements could be obtained by implementing changes and reforms 
to raise values in general and by approaching these two types of budget visibility to such 





1By revenue visibility we mean visibility of direct burden of public revenue. Some types 
of public revenue (for instance, revenue from public property) do not involve any burden 
in the strict sense here reserved for this term. Symmetrically, by public expenditure 
visibility, visibility of direct benefit of public expenditure must be understood. Again, 
some types of public expenditure (for example, public purchases of private financial assets 
at market prices) might not carry any benefit with them. 
 
2Inventory of Taxes Levied in the Member States of the European Communities, 15th 
edition, Commission of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1993. 
 
3A Manual on Government Finance Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Washington, 
1986, and Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2000, volume XXIV, International 
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